Using a detailed data set at the tariff line level, we find an emulator effect of multilateralism on subsequent regional trade agreements involving the US. We exploit the variation in the frequency with which the US has granted immediate duty free access (IDA) to its Free Trade Area partners across tariff lines. A key finding is that the US has granted IDA status especially on goods for which it had cut the multilateral MFN tariff during the Uruguay round the most. Thus, the Uruguay Round (multilateral) 'concessions' have emulated subsequent (preferential) trade liberalisation. We conclude from this that past liberalisation sows the seeds of future liberalisation and that multilateral and preferential trade agreements are dynamic complements.
INTRODUCTION
Many preferential trade agreements came to light since the completion in 1994 of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the GATT. The US is no exception. These agreements involving the US vary in scope -the number of goods included in the agreement varies across agreements -and breadth -the US tariff on some goods goes to zero immediately upon implementing the agreement but the imports of many other are fully liberalised only gradually. In this paper, we shed light on the causes of these cross-good variations and show that they are best though as the continuation of a process that includes multilateral liberalisations. Specifically, we find that the imports of goods that the US liberalises swiftly the most frequently on a preferential basis are also the goods for which it granted the boldest tariff cuts during the Uruguay Round. This finding is robust to a variety of specifications. The quantitative effect is also quite large. We interpret these findings as evidence that past multilateral (or non-discriminatory) trade agreements are a dynamic complement, or emulator, to consecutives regional (or preferential) agreements. 1 Our results matter for three reasons at least. First, one striking feature of the current world trading system is the explosion of regionalism, that is, the growth in the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Only 37 such agreements were in place at the launch of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994 but 421 PTAs had been notified to the GATT/WTO and 230 of them were in force as of December 2008. What is driving this growing proliferation of PTAs? In this paper, we make ours Wilfred Ethier's assertion that 'regionalism is an endogenous response to the multilateral trading system (Ethier 1998: 1216)'. Our research question can thus be summarized as asking the question "is multilateralism driving the proliferation of PTAs in any way?" This question has received surprisingly little academic interest so far. To the best of our knowledge, Ethier (1998) and Freund's (2000a) theoretical papers are rare, perhaps unique, exceptions. Our paper studies this question from an empirical perspective, focusing on the United States.
3 Second, our paper contributes to the large research agenda that asks whether regionalism and multilateralism substitutes or complements. Answering such questions is important, not least because several scholars fear that regionalism is a dynamic substitute, or stumbling block, to multilateral free trade and a menace to the multilateral trading system incarnated by the GATT/WTO (Bhagwati 1991 , Grossman and Helpman 1995 , Levy 1997 , Bagwell and Staiger 1998 , Krishna 1998 , McLaren 2002 , Limão 2007 .
2 Limão (2006) finds empirical support for the stumbling block hypothesis for the US case; Estevadeordal, Freund and Ornelas (2008) find a 'building block' effect in a sample of ten Latin American countries; Freund and Ornelas (forthcoming) provide an excellent review of this abundant literature. 3 We complement it by asking the causality question in the opposite direction, as Ethier (1998) and Freund (2000a) , but from an empirical angle.
Third, with few exceptions, existing theoretical studies on the complements-vs-substitutes issue address this question using either one-shot games or dynamic games that exhibit stable steady-state equilibrium tariffs. Therefore, these models are ill-suited to address the stylised fact illustrated in Figure 1 : US tariffs, both preferential and multilateral, keep falling over time. 4 Consequently, in addressing the question as to whether there exists any (causal) link between the two series, we ask whether multilateral tariff cuts are associated with more preferential tariff cuts: in noticeable departure from the existing literature, we don't run our regressions in level. Our regression results reveal that the US' preferential tariff cuts are a dynamic complement to its multilateral cuts. This provides (to the best of our knowledge: original) evidence in favour of the 'Juggernaut theory' of trade liberalisation, whereby current 2 Also not one month elapses without the economic press worrying about this issue. Editorial lines predominantly echoe the 'stumbling block' hypothesis. For economic and political mechanisms consistent with the 'building block' hypothesis, see e.g. Kennan and Riezman (1990) , Richardson (1993) , Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and Ornelas (2005a) . 3 Limão and Karakaovali (2008) find a stumbling block effect for the EU. Baldwin and Seghezza (2008) find a negative correlation between MFN tariffs and preference margins in their sample of 23 large countries. They conclude from this that the stumbling block mechanism, if it exists, is not of first order importance. 4 liberalisation, by eroding protectionist forces and hence resistance to future trade reforms, is sowing the seeds of future liberalisation (Baldwin 1994 , Staiger 1995 , Maggi and Rodrìguez-Clare 2007 , Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2007 .
The explanatory variable that is the focus of our interest is the multilateral tariff cut that we label 'CUT'. Our measure for CUT is the difference between the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round MFN tariffs. We want to relate this to a measure of the intensity of preferential trade liberalisation subsequent to the completion and much of the implementation of the Uruguay Round. In the US, resistance to preferential trade liberalisation (conditional on it taking place) cannot take the form of positive preferential tariffs for institutional reasons, as we explain in the data section of the paper. It can only take the form of delayed liberalisation.
Therefore, our measure of the intensity of post-Uruguay Round preferential trade liberalisation (or 'PTL') for each good is the frequency at which the US grants immediate duty-free access to its market to its FTA trading partners.
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For instance, the US grants immediate duty free access to all seven partners in our sample for 35% of the goods (2,627 goods out of 7,419), to none for 6% of the goods and to between one and all but one partners for 59% of the goods (See Figure 2) .
We find that an increase in the tariff CUT of one percentage point is associated with an increase in the probability of the US granting immediate duty-free access to its market to all trade partners by about twenty-five percent at the sample mean. Given that the standard error for CUT in the sample is 4.34 percentage points, this is a large effect.
An alternative interpretation for our results is also possible: the dynamic complementarities between the Uruguay Round and the preferential tariff cuts might just reflect dynamic complementarities between past and current liberalisations -regardless of the level (preferential or multilateral) at which they are conducted. Perhaps the US grants these 5 'concessions' at the preferential level because the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks is currently stalling. This latter hypothesis, which we label 'the money left on the table hypothesis', is quite popular among many pundits or in the press (The Economist is a particularly ardent propagator of this view of the world). Note that the two explanations are not mutually exclusive. We control for this hypothesis in two ways. First, we introduce the Uruguay Round MFN tariff rate as a control in all our regressions. The estimated coefficient is negative, implying that the US disproportionately grants duty free access to its market on a preferential basis for goods that have a low MFN tariff rate already. This rejects the money left on the table hypothesis. Second, it turns out that the US did not cut MFN tariffs at the Uruguay Round on about 22% of goods in our sample; so, we introduce a dummy variable for such goods as an additional control, recognizing that these might be different for some reason.
The estimated coefficient of this control is statistically significant and positive, implying that the Uruguay Round and the ensuing preferential tariff cuts are dynamic substitutes for these goods. The presence of this control among the independent variables also increases the estimated coefficient of CUT, which reinforces our emulator finding for the remaining 78% of tariff lines. We also control for the share of each partner in US trade; we find no effect, suggesting that no partner is any more 'natural' in getting favourable tariff cuts than in triggering trade creation relative to trade diversion, as first pointed out by Krishna (2003) .
Several explanations may explain this emulator effect but not all of them imply that past (multilateral) trade liberalisation is a force behind current (preferential) trade liberalisation.
We pursue several routes in order to interpret the positive correlation between multilateral tariff cuts and preferential liberalisation in causal way. As we explain in Section 4, we rely on the timing of events to rule out reverse causation. Dealing with the presence of omitted variables like political economics forces is more involved Seghezza 2008, Estevadeordal et al. 2008) . We start by introducing 2-digit sector dummies to control for characteristics that are common across goods of the same industry. Our results show that this improves the identification of the emulator hypothesis. We then estimate a different CUT coefficient for goods that are protected by non-tariff measures (NTM) and/or prohibitively costly rules of origin (RoO). If third factors were to explain the correlation between CUT and preferential trade liberalisation in full, then the conditional CUT coefficients should not systematically differ across goods categories. By contrast, if multilateral tariff cuts cause 6 preferential tariff cuts, then our identifying assumption for the emulator effect is that it be strongest when it maters the most, namely, for goods that have no NTMs or prohibitive RoOs.
The results are consistent with this assumption: there is no emulator effect for goods with NTMs; the emulator effect is stronger for goods with prohibitively costly RoOs.
We also use existing theoretical results as an alternative way of identifying the emulator effect. We construct our argument by combining two ingredients. Our first ingredient is dynamic: Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) and others postulate that past trade liberalisation in a given sector undermines its current resistance to trade openness because trade liberalisation decreases the (quasi) rents associated with the (quasi) fixed factors that fight for protection. Over time, these factors depreciate and with them the resistance to trade liberalisation. Thus, over the years, this logic repeats and the past trade liberalisation feeds current and future liberalisation; once started, like a juggernaut, it keeps rolling. Our second ingredient is static: in the Protection For Sale (PFS) framework due to Grossman and Helpman (1994) , Gawande, Krishna and Olarreaga (2009) formalize the idea that downstream sectors oppose protection of domestic upstream sectors from which they source. By a symmetric argument, upstream sectors favour protection in the domestic downstream sectors they sell to. Taken together, the PFS and the juggernaut logics imply that the emulator effect is strongest in upstream sectors and weakest in downstream ones. Consistent with this prior, the data reject the alternative hypothesis whereby there should be no differential effect.
Finally, we also experimented with instrumenting for MFN tariff cuts and levels with the corresponding EU tariff cuts and levels. This strategy is not faultless, but EU tariffs were too weakly correlated with their US counterparts to make them valid instruments anyway (this came as a surprise to us). We therefore do not discuss these issues or the results further.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 further discusses work related to ours. Section 3 defines the variables and the data. Section 4 introduces our estimation strategy and displays the baseline empirical results; Section 5 reports various identification strategies of the emulator effect while robustness checks are relegated to Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 7
RELATED LITERATURE
Our findings are consistent with two different arguments put forth in the theoretical literature. A similar line of analysis as the one above asks whether the conditions under which PTAs are enforceable are affected by the multilateral trading environment (Freund 2002b and Ornelas 2005b) . In these models, the static costs and benefits from protection are time-invariant by construction, so that natural solution to this kind of dynamic problem is a stationary tariff.
However, if anything, tariffs fall over time and hence this line of explanation misses an important dimension of the real world.
The second strand of the theoretical literature that is related to our empirical work focuses on the dynamic aspect of trade agreements, putting aside the dimension of regionalism versus multilateralism, and seeks to explain why tariffs tend to fall over time. Maggi and RodriguezClare (2007) is a key contribution here. Recognising that some sector-specific factors of production like (human) capital depreciate gradually over time, they stress that the politically optimal tariff is thus also decreasing over time as a result. See also Baldwin (1994 ), Staiger (1995 and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) . The central finding for our purpose is that past liberalisation sows the seeds of current liberalisation by eroding the rents from protection. Freund (2000a) and McLaren (2002) also combine dynamic aspects of trade liberalisation with the regionalism versus multilateralism issue but their focus (the hysteretic effects of preferential trade barriers) is different.
From an empirical point of view, the main strand of the literature that relates to our research is on the determinants of RTAs formation. Several papers study the economic determinants of RTAs (Baier and Bergstrand 2004, Egger and Larch 2008) . The main identifying assumption remains that RTA-related trade gains are closely linked to the standard gravity covariates. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) find that the likelihood of an RTA is larger, the closer the two countries are to each other, the more remote they are from the rest of the world, the larger their GDPs, the smaller the difference between their GDPs, the larger their relative factor endowment difference, and the wider the (absolute) difference between their and the rest of the world capital-labor ratios. Building on Baier and Bergstrand (2004) , Egger and Larch find that multilateralism causes peace-motivated regional trade agreements (RTA). The logic goes as follows: countries that have fought wars in the distant past tend to sign RTAs as a way of increasing the opportunity cost of a bilateral war, thereby reducing the probability that possible bilateral conflicts might escalate into wars. In previous work (Martin et al. 2008) , the same authors show that multilateral trade reduces the opportunity cost of a bilateral war.
Taken together, this line of reasoning and these results imply that an increase of multilateralism raises the probability of bilateral war among old foes and they then enter bilateral or regional trade deals as an endogenous response to this threat it poses to bilateral peace. The macro-level empirical evidence in Martin et al. (2009) , which is supportive of this argument, complements our micro-level evidence.
Importantly, whereas we take the existence of the Free Trade Agreement as given, and aim to find out which tariff lines are liberalised the most swiftly, the three aforementioned papers aim to explain the formation of PTAs.
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES, DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
In the case of the United States (and others), the legally binding and the applied MFN tariffs coincide exactly (by definition the latter may not be higher than the former), so we refer to them as the MFN tariff for short. 
MFN

Uruguay
. CUT is our good-specific measure of the intensity of multilateral trade liberalisation, so we may write CUT g to be more explicit (with the subscript g denoting the good). The stated aim of the Uruguay Round was to cut tariffs by about 30% but in the end Canada, the EU, Japan, and the US achieved a larger reduction on average ( analysis, an 'observation' is a good-and-partner entry for PT g,p . Our reference sample has 51,814 observations, which is slightly lower than 7 x 7,419 = 51,933, because not all goods are included in all PTAs. It turns out that in the US case, each PTA is in fact a free trade agreement (FTA) de jure, namely, the tariffs of all included goods all eventually go to zero. In our notation, this implies that PT = 0 at the end of the so-called 'implementation period' (specified in the agreement).
By contrast, there is considerable variation in the timing of the implementation of this free trade policy about both goods and partners: overall, 69% of our observations are fully liberalised at the start of the implementation of the FTA, whereas goods that are included in any of the FTAs but that are liberalised only gradually represent 27% of our observations; the rest consists of good-partner pairs that are excluded from the corresponding FTA altogether (fewer than 4% of observations).
We also use the information available in the TRAINS database for non tariff measures 
ESTIMATION STRATEGY AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
At a very general level, we would ideally like to regress the preference margin on the multilateral CUT, that is, estimate an equation of the form
The 'emulator effect' predicts a positive , whereas a negative  would be consistent with a dynamic version of the 'money left on the table hypothesis'.
The problem with a naïve estimation of (1) is that the US institutional setting is such that a Preferential Trade Agreement is de jure a Free Trade Agreement. This makes using the intensive margin of preferential trade liberalisation as the dependent variable problematic (at the end of the implementation period PT = 0, hence PM boils down to MFN Uruguay by definition). For this reason we exploit instead its extensive margin and the timing of the preferential liberalisation. Our first cut through the data is to set goods that are granted duty free access to the US market immediately upon implementation of each of the seven FTAs in the sample apart from other goods. The idea is that these goods are the easiest to liberalise on a preferential basis and we want to understand the dimensions that make such goods special.
Inspection of FIGURE 2 also shows that the most frequent number of times a good is granted 'immediate duty-free access' (IDA) to the US market is the maximum (seven We also create two additional measures along those lines, the binary variable ONE g that takes value 1 if good g gets IDA status in at least one FTA and 0 otherwise and the count variable NTL g that counts the number of FTAs in which g gets IDA; these being mostly robustness checks, we postpone the regression results for ONE g and NTL g to Section 6.
As our second measure of the extensive margin of preferential trade liberalisation, we define a good-and partner-specific measure of preferential trade liberalisation for our central specification that takes value 1 if imports of good g from partner p are granted the IDA status upon implementation of the FTA in question and zero otherwise.
We include the most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff rate in application MFN g in all specifications. The motivation for doing this has to do with testing the static version of the 'money left on the table hypothesis', whereby there is more room to include a tariff line in a PTA if the MFN rate is relatively high to start with. Let us emphasize that MFN g is orthogonal to CUT g (the correlation is -.01 in our reference sample) so including it or not does not affect 9 A comment about goods-partner pairs that do net get the IDA status is in order here. Goods g that are included
in the PTA p but that are liberalised only gradually and goods that are excluded from that PTA altogether are both coded the same way. This is because the frequency of the latter in the data is very low (less than 5 percent of good-partner pairs). Our qualitative results do not change if we drop these observations from the sample.
13 the estimated coefficient  1 . This somewhat surprising feature of the data is also helpful for our identification strategy and we return to it shortly.
Evidence at the good level: Logit
We start by running the following logit:
where 
; then G is a partition of  and we use ( ) G g to denote the HS-2 sector in which good g is classified. Thus, G is also a mapping : good sector G  .
Though we view (2) as a closed form relationship between PTL and CUT, we must assume that g CUT is exogenous in order to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates of the coefficients. Our strategy to rid ourselves of the reverse causation bias rests on the timing of events. We limit our sample to the seven PTAs that entered into force after the conclusion of the Uruguay round in 1994. This sample selection is expected to eliminate any reverse- Together, these three working assumption constitute our maintained identification hypothesis. We complement them with additional approaches in Section 5.
We use sector fixed effects at a relatively high degree of aggregation so that our sample has a large number of observations for each partner p and for each sector G; as a result, the β's in the conditional logit in (3) are consistently estimated. Table 2 presents the results. We report odds ratios throughout. The odds ratios associated to  j is defined as exp j  (j = 1,2,...) and has the meaning that a one extra percentage point in CUT raises the probability of granting IDA status to all partners for the good in question by a factor 1 exp  relative to not including the tariff line or delaying setting this preferential tariff to zero.
The two independent variables of interest, CUT and MFN, are significant beyond the one 10 What is usually recognized is that the APEC summit together with NAFTA helped "squeeze the European by a third (1 -.657 = .343).
In Column (3), we add a good-specific dummy DIFF0 that takes value DIFF0 g = 1 if the US did not liberalise good g during the Uruguay Round (i.e. if CUT g = 0) and zero otherwise.
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That is, we estimate
The fact that goods that were not liberalised during the Uruguay round -because these sectors are better organised and successfully fought to be left out of the Uruguay round entirely, saymight be quite different from other goods motivates this specification. The coefficient  3 is positive at the one percent level, implying that goods that were not liberalised at the multilateral level were more likely to be liberalised at the preferential level: this is consistent with a dynamic version of the 'money left on the table hypothesis.' Adding this control also raises the odds ratio of CUT to 1.33. Thus, the effect of CUT on IDA is 'non-linear': the US grants IDA status more frequently for goods for which the Uruguay Round CUT was zero as well as for those that had a large CUT. The net effect is consistent with the emulator hypothesis by our finding reported in Table 2 , Col. (2).
The results reported in Columns (4) and (5) 
Pr 1 ,
where f p is a partner dummy and the other right-hand side variables are as in (2). consider running (3) as a conservative robustness check that provides a lower bound for the emulator effect and the other effects we control for.
With this caveat in mind, turn to 
includes neither domestic production nor import elasticities. The former omission is harmless:
for each good, there are several import sources (the partners) and possibly a different PT for each of them; this enables us to estimate  4 via the cross-sectional variation of SM along the p-dimension. The latter, however, introduces measurement error in the estimation of  4 . Also, the left-hand side of the structural PFS model is different from the LHS of (3). With these caveats in mind, the estimated coefficient in column (5) of Table 3 is statistically positive at the one-percent level. This is consistent with the PFS qualitative prediction for organised sectors. This finding is important for the interpretation of the emulator effect as evidence of the juggernaut mechanism. The estimated odds ratio corresponding to  4 is equal to 1.04, which implies that an increase in the import penetration ratio of the pair (g, p) by 1 percent increases the odds of the US granting IDA status to p's exports of good g by 4 percentage points. In other words, the US grants IDA status disproportionately to important import sources. The estimated coefficient is stable across specifications.
We might also expect the US to grant tariff-free access to important trading partners as part of broader foreign and trade policy objectives. 
as an overall measure of the importance of p as a trading partner for the US. SALL, SMALL and SXALL are defined at the partner level, so we drop the partner dummy in these regressions. Column (6) reports the results for SALL (the results for SMALL and SXALL are similar so we omit them). The estimated coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero, rejecting the hypothesis that the US grants free access to its markets disproportionately to large partners.
Finally, we re-run (3) for each partner separately (more precisely, the specification corresponding to Table 3 , Col. 5). 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE 'EMULATOR EFFECT'
The 'emulator' effect seems to be a robust feature of the data, unlike the 'money left on the table' argument. We have so far relied mostly on the timing of events to identify the effect. In this section, we use the interaction between our variable of interest (CUT) and non-tariff measures (Section 5.1), the rules of origin (Section 5.2) or the type of goods (Section 5.3) to interpret the positive correlation between CUT and IDA in a causal way.
5.1.
Non-tariff measures
We start by controlling for the presence of non tariff measures, or 'NTM', at the tariff line.
14 The idea is that the presence of such non-tariff measures should weaken the effect of CUT on preferential liberalisation: a multilaterally agreed tariff cut is less effective if the imports of that good are impeded by other measures. We thus expect the CUT coefficient to be larger for NTM-free goods than for goods with some NTM. To test this idea, we create a dummy variable NTM g that takes value one if the tariff line g has some NTM and zero if g is NTMfree.
We first re-run (2), adding the NTM dummy and its interaction with CUT. Table 5 , Col. (2) reports the results; these have to be compared with Col. (1), which reports the odds ratios of our baseline specification (Table 2, Col. 5). As expected, the CUT coefficient for NTM-free goods is (much) larger than for NTM goods; the difference is significant at any conventional
level. The coefficient for CUT in goods with non-tariff measures is insignificant (the odds ratio is one). This finding is exactly what we should expect if multilateral and preferential
tariff cuts are dynamic complements and if the presence of NTMs prevents the emulator effect from playing its role. We repeat this exercise for the good-partner specification (3) and the results, reported in Table 5 , Col. (4), do not affect these conclusions.
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These findings thus vindicate our emulator hypothesis further. By contrast, the odds ratio of MFN falls, weakening further the 'money left on the table hypothesis'.
Unused rules of origin
It is well-known that the compliance costs of rules of origin (RoO henceforth) can be prohibitive (Krishna 2006) . Specifically, when the preference margin is low, foreign exporters might not bother with complying with rules of origin. In our setting, the preference margin is 14 There are 19% of tariff lines with an NTM in our reference sample.
15 (Estevadeordal et al. 2008) . We expect the CUT coefficient to be larger for RoO-goods than for goods that have irrelevant rules of origin. To identify this differential effect in the data, we construct a dummy variable RoO g that takes value 1 if MFN g > 2.5 (when foreign exporters are expected to use the preference and thus to comply with the rules of origin) and zero otherwise and we re-run (2) and (3) with this dummy as an additional control variable. Here, the results are as again supportive; the Wald statistics rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same at the one percent level. We have re-ran (2) and (3) with 2 and 3 percentage points as thresholds (results not reported); the qualitative results were not affected.
In sum, the differential effect of CUT on granting IDA status for goods affected by rules of origin or non-tariff measures that we find in the data confirms this set of predictions of the emulator hypothesis.
The role of intermediate goods
As we shall see in Section 6, the emulator effect is non-linear. Specifically, the largest emulator effect is between granting this preferential access to all partners or not, rather than between some partners or none. This in turn suggests that the type of goods might be more important than the partners' characteristics; also, when we include sector dummies in our regressions, the coefficients of interest tend to rise in a significant way, suggesting that 21 unobserved sector-invariant characteristics are indeed important. Therefore, we split the sample among the following categories of goods that correspond to different stages of production in the value chain: Basic manufacturing, Consumption goods, Equipment goods, Intermediate goods, Mixed products and Primary goods and we estimate one β 1 for each category in our baseline regression (with MFN and DIFF0 as controls). Table 7 Table 7 . The emulator effect is weakest for Primary, Consumption and Basic manufacturing goods; it is statistically much stronger for Equipment and Intermediate goods.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section we subject our results to a variety of robustness checks. We start by running alternative specifications to (2); as we shall see, these establish that the emulator effect is nonlinear.
Evidence at the good level: Alternative logit
In our quest for the effects of CUT on the IDA status of goods, specification (2) with SEVEN as the dependent variable is quite conservative insofar as it lumps together goods that are excluded from all FTAs altogether with goods that are granted IDA status in all but one FTA.
Other categorizations of the data are possible.
Our first robustness check is to run a logit that is the mirror image of (2):
where ONE takes value one if the specific good gets IDA status into the US market in at least one FTA and zero otherwise (i.e.
indicator function that takes value 1 if its component is equal to zero and value 0 otherwise).
We report the results in the Table 8 , which is symmetric to Table 2 (same set of controls, same estimator). Qualitatively, all the findings are similar to those of Table 2 . Quantitatively, the positive effect of CUT and the negative effects of MFN, DIFF0 and SNAFTA in (4) are smaller (in absolute value) than in (2). The odds ratio corresponding to the coefficient of interest  1 is ranges from 1.13 in the baseline specification to 1.17 with the DIFF0, SM and SNAFTA controls, implying that an additional one-percentage point multilateral tariff CUT is associated with a 13 -17 % increase in the odds of including the good in the group of IDA goods. Though quite strong, the effect of CUT on ONE is weaker than its effect on SEVEN.
This suggests that the domestic resistance to preferential trade liberalisation is decreasing in the number of IDA statuses being granted at the margin.
Evidence at the good level: Poisson
A natural alternative to (2) and (4) is to regress the number of times good g is being granted
IDA status, defined, as The results of the first step (6) are reported in Table 10 , panel (a). As expected, the exponentiated coefficients are the mirror image of those of Table 2 (the values of 1 j   in tables 2 and 5 are comparable for all j = 1,2,…) and thus require no further discussion.
Likewise, the results for the second step (7) are comparable to those of (5) by the same token.
They also confirm our priors, in line with our earlier finding, that most of the emulator effect is captured by SEVEN. The economic significance of the coefficients is small (though all coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level with the exception of SM, which is significant at the five percent level).
Taken together, the findings of Tables 2 and 8 to 10 imply that the manifestation of the emulator effect is non-linear and most strongly felt between granting 7 IDA statuses and 6
IDA statuses or fewer.
6.4.
Interaction between CUT and MFN
Finally, we interact CUT with MFN in all the specifications above. The motivation for this exercise is to further distinguish between the 'money left on the table hypothesis' and the emulator effect. Indeed, it could be said that current preferential IDA is a substitute to current multilateral liberalisation; put differently, it could be that the dynamic complementarity between past (multilateral) cuts and current (preferential) liberalisation that we have uncovered so far hides a static substitution between multilateralism and regionalism. If that 'static substitution' hypothesis was true, then we should expect the effect of CUT on IDA to be strongest where there is more room for manoeuvre, that is, where MFN tariff rates are largest. In order to verify this empirically, we re-run all the baseline specifications above with an interaction term. Table 11 reports the results. The first thing to note is that the coefficient of MFN * CUT is strongly negative (its odds ratio is lower than unity), which rebukes this hypothesis. Second, comparing the results of Table 11 , Col. (1), (2), (3) and (4) to Col. (5) in Tables 2, 3, 8 and 9, respectively, adding this interaction term increases the coefficient on CUT and reduces the coefficient on MFN. Results obtained with the Hurdle estimation strategy largely confirm these patterns.
We interpret all these results as adding extra pieces of evidence if favour of the emulator hypothesis and against the alternative money left on the table hypothesis.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between cuts in MFN bound rates negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the GATT (1986 GATT ( -1994 and the depth and breadth of Preferential Trade Agreements signed in the aftermath of its completion. Our empirical investigation focuses on the United States using official tariff line level data. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is unique in looking at the causal relationship from multilateralism to regionalism. The existing empirical literature is exclusively looking at the relationship running the other way. This line of research is motivated by the view expressed in numerous theoretical contributions that regionalism may have a 'stumbling block' effect on multilateral trade liberalisation (Bhagwati 1991) . If the stumbling block hypothesis is correct, then the proliferation of PTAs involving at least one WTO member is guilty of slowing down and threatening the 'Doha round' of negotiations at the GATT/WTO. A related and pessimistic received wisdom, which runs in the other direction, is that the explosion of regionalism is a symptom of the difficulties encountered by the Doha round.
The main findings of the paper are that (i) the imports of goods that the US liberalises swiftly the most frequently on a preferential basis are also the goods for which it granted the largest MFN tariff reductions during the Uruguay Round, (ii) this effect is robust qualitatively but (5) and (6) report results from Hurdle estimation and should then be considered jointly. Column (5) shows results obtained in the first step (a logit estimation). Column (6) shows results obtained in the second step (a truncated poisson estimation). Note that we expect the coefficients of the Hurdle regressions to be the opposite of the coefficients in Col. (1) to (4) because the Hurdle regressions are specified as the mirror image of the logit and Poisson regressions.
